Imikom Agent: Analyzing GitHub and Google Sheets Cloud Dead-Drop C2 Tradecraft

Technical teardown of a sophisticated C-based malware development pipeline featuring GitHub Contents API and Google Sheets C2 channels, BYOVD EDR blinding, and process hollowing.

Imikom Agent: Analyzing GitHub and Google Sheets Cloud Dead-Drop C2 Tradecraft
Primary Case Exhibit: Imikom Agent: Analyzing GitHub and Google Sheets Cloud Dead-Drop C2 Tradecraft

Executive Summary

Analysis of an exposed malware staging server at 2[.]27[.]63[.]244:9999 exposed the source code, automated compiler toolchains, and driver payloads for a stealthy implant framework designated Imikom Agent.

Designed specifically to operate within tightly monitored corporate enclaves with strict outbound traffic restrictions (e.g., Deep Packet Inspection on FortiGate and Palo Alto firewalls), Imikom replaces standard direct HTTP/HTTPS connections with Cloud Dead-Drop Resolvers running over GitHub’s Contents API and Google Sheets API.

Furthermore, the framework incorporates Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) tradecraft, bundling signed kernel drivers (HWiNFO_x64_206.sys and TRIXX.sys) to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) kernel hooks.


1. Cloud Dead-Drop C2 Transports

The most distinctive capability in the Imikom codebase is its pluggable transport architecture designed to blend malicious command-and-control into reputable cloud provider traffic.

A. GitHub Contents API Transport (github_c2.c)

As documented directly in the source comments:

"FortiGate bypass: agent → api.github.com (trusted CDN) → relay → Mythic"

/* Protocol sequence in github_c2.c */
// 1. Agent writes encrypted Mythic payload -> nodes/{agent_id}/out
// 2. Cloud Relay reads out, forwards to backend Mythic C2, writes response -> nodes/{agent_id}/in
// 3. Relay clears out, agent polls in, executes tasks and clears in

Because all client network traffic terminates on https://api[.]github[.]com over valid TLS certificates, corporate firewalls categorizing traffic by domain reputation perceive the communication as benign developer activity.

  • Relay Repository: derwingoww/edge-nodes
  • Transport Headers: Authenticated via embedded GitHub Personal Access Tokens (ghp_...).

B. Google Sheets API Transport (deploy_google_sheets.c)

In environments where GitHub access is restricted, the builder compiles an alternate transport utilizing Google Sheets as an asynchronous message queue:

  • Interacts with sheets[.]googleapis[.]com and oauth2[.]googleapis[.]com.
  • Uses OAuth2 client IDs and refresh tokens to read task commands from designated spreadsheet cells and write Base64-encoded execution results back to output sheets.

2. BYOVD: Kernel-Level EDR Blinding

The staging repository contained multiple signed, legitimate Windows hardware drivers known to possess arbitrary kernel read/write vulnerabilities:

  • HWiNFO_x64_206.sys (HWiNFO kernel driver)
  • TRIXX.sys (Sapphire TRIXX overclocking driver)

Mechanism of Action

By dropping and temporarily loading these signed drivers via the Service Control Manager (CreateServiceA), the unprivileged malware abuses driver IOCTL interfaces to write directly to kernel space (ntoskrnl.exe), nullifying EDR process creation callbacks (PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine) and thread inspection routines.


3. Masquerading & In-Memory Execution

Imikom’s build pipeline compiles customized binaries disguised as standard administrative tools:

  • OfficeSupport.exe (Persists under C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Office with a scheduled task)
  • WindowsTelemetry.exe

Anti-Analysis & Memory Protections

  1. Stack String Obfuscation (obfstr.h): Crucial telemetry strings, C2 paths (/api/v2/telemetry/batch), and registry locations are encrypted at rest with multi-byte XOR keys and only decrypted onto the stack immediately prior to usage.
  2. Process Hollowing (hollow.c): Unpacks and injects the core PE payload into legitimate Windows host binaries (svchost.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe).
  3. AMSI & ETW Patching: Automatically disables Antimalware Scan Interface (AmsiScanBuffer) and Event Tracing for Windows (EtwEventWrite) in memory before executing scripts.

4. Indicators of Compromise (Defanged)

IOC TypeIndicatorContext
IPv42[.]27[.]63[.]244Staging & Build Server (Fastweb, Italy)
Port / Service2[.]27[.]63[.]244:9999Exposed Tooling & Artifact Repository
Domaincdn-staticfiles[.]comDefault Fallback HTTPS C2 Domain
GitHub Repoderwingoww/edge-nodesCovert Dead-Drop Relay Repository
Driver Hash (SHA256)HWiNFO_x64_206.sysVulnerable Driver for BYOVD Kernel Blinding
Driver Hash (SHA256)TRIXX.sysVulnerable Driver for BYOVD Kernel Blinding
Persistence TaskOfficeSupportScheduled Task Persistence
Persistence Path%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Office\OfficeSupport.exeDropped Payload Path

5. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1102.001 – Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver (GitHub / Google Sheets C2)
  • T1068 – Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (BYOVD driver exploitation)
  • T1055.012 – Process Hollowing (Injection into trusted binaries)
  • T1562.001 – Disable or Modify Tools (AMSI patching & EDR callback blinding)
  • T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name (WindowsTelemetry.exe)
  • T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information (Stack string encryption)