Threat Cluster 217[.]216[.]79[.]49

Exposed staging, C2 and beacon artifact hosting, tunneling or proxy support, credential and system collection, web-facing exploitation testing, and possible post-compromise operator workspace management.

Threat Cluster 217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085

This dossier was generated from passive HTTP observation and static filename correlation. The endpoint was not logged into, exploited, modified, or used to submit data. Listed artifacts were not opened, downloaded, hashed, or executed.

Evidence Coverage

MetricValue
Root directory listing acquired2 captures
Unique root-level entries observed151
Entries added between captures0
Entries removed between captures0
Current exposureUnauthenticated HTTP directory listing
Text / configuration artifacts acquired0
Windows PE binaries acquired0
Linux ELF binaries acquired0
Artifact hashes computed from target host0
Dynamic execution performedNo
Login, exploitation, modification, or submission performedNo
Exact listing persistenceConfirmed across two captures

Motivation & Objectives

Strategic Motivation

The host presents a persistent unauthenticated directory containing a heterogeneous collection of Windows, .NET, Java, PowerShell, PHP, ASP.NET, Python, and packaged artifacts. Filename semantics indicate a possible operator workspace or staging directory supporting beacon or C2 material, tunneling and proxying, credential or system collection, and public-facing application testing. These interpretations are triage hypotheses; artifact contents and runtime behavior were not acquired.

Operational Objectives

  • C2 and Beacon Staging: Hosting artifacts named beacon-v8, beacon-v9f, beacon-v9f-agent, beacon-v9g, beacon-v9h, and beacon-v10, alongside wh_beacon.txt.

  • Tunneling and Remote Access: Maintaining Chisel-related files and rdp_proxy.py, rdp_proxy2.py, and rdp_proxy3.py for possible relay, pivot, or remote-access support.

  • Credential and System Collection: Exposing files named tok_steal.ps1, tok2.ps1, regsave.ps1, regsave.txt, recv_hive.php, and jwks.json, which warrant controlled review for token, registry, hive, or authentication-material handling.

  • Web-Facing Collection and Proxying: Hosting PHP and ASP.NET handlers including api-proxy.php, collect.php, recv.php, recv_hive.php, proxy.php, redirect_ssrf.php, rfi_check.php, and relay.aspx.

  • Exploit and Reconnaissance Testing: Exposing Exploit.class, cf_probe/, inet_probe.txt, probe-callao.txt, probe789, and CORS-labelled proof-of-concept pages.

  • Windows/.NET and Java Payload Staging: Maintaining .exe, .dll, .cs, .ps1, .war, .aspx, .pkg, and .cab artifacts in a publicly indexed location.

Inferred Target Profile

  • Enterprise Windows workstations and servers

  • Internet-facing web and application infrastructure

  • Remote access, RDP, and perimeter systems

  • Cloud, identity, token, and authentication services

  • Systems exposed to unauthorized payload staging or web-handler access

Key Operational Findings

  • Persistent unauthenticated directory listing on 217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085.

  • Exactly 151 root entries were present in both the prior and current captures.

  • No additions or removals were detected between the two captures.

  • Beacon-like artifact families were publicly listed, including beacon-v8, beacon-v9f, beacon-v9f-agent, and beacon-v10.

  • Chisel tunneling artifacts and multiple RDP proxy scripts were publicly listed.

  • PowerShell and server-side files were named for token, registry, hive, proxy, SSRF, RFI, and collection functions.

  • Java, .NET, Windows executable, DLL, package, and ASP.NET artifacts were present.

  • Certificate/key-like files sipro4.pem and sipro_script.pem were publicly listed by name.

  • The host most closely resembles a Windows-oriented staging node in the broad operational space of the supplied 93[.]152[.]223[.]39 and 101[.]42[.]255[.]92 dossiers.

  • No direct hash, URL, certificate, credential, or artifact-content link to the supplied 150[.]241[.]65[.]250 or 194[.]238[.]57[.]124 clusters was established.

  • No direct evidence of successful victim compromise, active C2, or execution of the listed artifacts was acquired.

Credentials, Keys & Tokens (Redacted)

RiskTypeRedacted ValueSource / Layer
High / UnconfirmedPotential private key or certificate material[NOT ACQUIRED — sipro4.pem AND sipro_script.pem WERE ONLY OBSERVED BY FILENAME]Root directory listing / L0
High / UnconfirmedPotential token or credential collection material[NOT ACQUIRED — tok_steal.ps1, tok2.ps1, regsave.ps1, recv_hive.php, AND jwks.json WERE ONLY OBSERVED BY FILENAME]Root directory listing / L0
Medium / UnconfirmedPotential authentication, database, or session material[NOT ACQUIRED — RELATED .txt, .dat, .json, AND SERVER-SIDE FILES REQUIRE AUTHORIZED REVIEW]Root directory listing / L0

Verified Indicators

TypeDefanged Value / HashContextConfidence
Investigated Host217[.]216[.]79[.]49User-supplied investigated hostHigh (observed)
Service Endpoint217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085Persistent unauthenticated HTTP directory listingHigh (observed)
HTTP TitleDirectory listing for /Returned by the investigated endpointHigh (observed)
Root Listing Size151 entriesExact count in prior and current capturesHigh (computed)
Beacon Filename Patternbeacon-v8, beacon-v9f, beacon-v9f-agent, beacon-v9g, beacon-v9h, beacon-v10Publicly listed root artifactsHigh (filename observed)
Tunneling Filename Patternchisel.exe, chisel_v1101.exe, chisel_1.10.1_windows_amd64.gz, chisel_packed.dat, chisel_win.datPublicly listed root artifactsHigh (filename observed)
Proxy Filename Patternrdp_proxy.py, rdp_proxy2.py, rdp_proxy3.py, proxy.php, api-proxy.phpPublicly listed root artifactsHigh (filename observed)
Credential/System Collection Patterntok_steal.ps1, tok2.ps1, regsave.ps1, regsave.txt, recv_hive.php, jwks.jsonPublicly listed root artifactsHigh (filename observed)
Web Handler Patterncollect.php, recv.php, recv_hive.php, redirect_ssrf.php, rfi_check.php, relay.aspxPublicly listed root artifactsHigh (filename observed)
Exploit/Probe PatternExploit.class, cf_probe/, inet_probe.txt, probe-callao.txt, probe789Publicly listed root artifactsHigh (filename observed)
Key/Certificate Filename Patternsipro4.pem, sipro_script.pemPublicly listed root artifacts; contents not acquiredHigh (filename observed)
Related Cluster150[.]241[.]65[.]250:889Supplied dossier describes separate Linux/IoT staging infrastructureHigh (user-supplied evidence)
Related Historical Infrastructure94[.]154[.]43[.]249Present in supplied 150/194 cluster evidence; not observed on current hostMedium (user-supplied correlation)

Windows LNK Findings

FileRelative PathWorking DirectoryArguments / Command Hints
None observed in the directory listing

The absence of a visible .lnk filename is limited to the root listing. No descendants or file contents were acquired.

PE Candidates

CandidateSourceArchitectureEntry PointSuspicious SectionsSHA-256
Aplicativo.exe, c.exe, cs.exe, gp.exe, hook_fcc4.exe, mssync.exe, svcdiag.exe, tlu.exe, update.exe, winaux.exe, and other .exe namesRoot directory listingNot determinedNot determinedNot determinedNot available
DnsClient.dll, MongoDB.*.dll, r.dll, SharpCompress.dll, System.*.dll, and other .dll namesRoot directory listingNot determinedNot determinedNot determinedNot available

No PE file was acquired or statically parsed. The entries above are PE candidates by filename extension only, not confirmed malicious binaries.

Deep Technical Threat Analysis

1. Executive Technical Assessment

The endpoint is best assessed as high-priority suspicious exposed infrastructure with a Windows/.NET and web-oriented staging profile. The direct evidence is a persistent unauthenticated directory listing containing beacon-like filenames, tunneling and proxy artifacts, credential/system-collection-labelled scripts, server-side request handlers, and exploit/probe-labelled files.

The evidence supports a public staging or operator-workspace role, but it does not prove that every file is malicious, that the host is compromised, that the listed files were executed, or that the host is controlled by the same operator as any supplied cluster.

2. Artifact Inventory

Artifact FamilyTypeSizeSHA-256Notes
beacon-v8, beacon-v9f, beacon-v9f-agent, beacon-v9g, beacon-v9h, beacon-v10Unknown executable or payload artifactsNot acquiredNot availableNames suggest beacon or C2-related staging; framework identity unconfirmed.
chisel.exe, chisel_v1101.exe, chisel_1.10.1_windows_amd64.gzWindows executable/archive candidatesNot acquiredNot availableNames suggest tunneling or relay tooling; behavior unverified.
rdp_proxy.py, rdp_proxy2.py, rdp_proxy3.pyPython scriptsNot acquiredNot availableNames suggest RDP proxy or relay functions.
tok_steal.ps1, tok2.ps1, regsave.ps1PowerShell script candidatesNot acquiredNot availableNames suggest token or registry collection; no script content acquired.
collect.php, recv.php, recv_hive.php, proxy.php, redirect_ssrf.php, rfi_check.php, relay.aspxServer-side script candidatesNot acquiredNot availableCould support collection, proxying, webshell, SSRF, or RFI testing.
Exploit.class, hapi.warJava class/archive candidatesNot acquiredNot availableJava-related exploit or application staging is possible but unconfirmed.
sipro4.pem, sipro_script.pemCertificate/private-key candidatesNot acquiredNot availableTreat as sensitive until contents and ownership are established.
Aplicativo.exe, c.exe, cs.exe, gp.exe, hook_fcc4.exe, mssync.exe, svcdiag.exe, tlu.exe, update.exe, winaux.exeWindows PE candidatesNot acquiredNot availableFilename-based candidates only; no static analysis performed.
Remaining listed objectsMixed text, data, package, archive, web, and directory entriesNot acquiredNot availableRoot listing contained 151 total entries.

3. Script and Artifact Behaviors

No script or binary content was acquired from the endpoint. The following behaviors are therefore filename-based analytic hypotheses rather than verified execution results:

BehaviorEvidenceAssessment
Beacon/C2 stagingMultiple beacon-* filenames and wh_beacon.txtPossible payload or C2 artifact hosting; framework and activity unconfirmed.
Network tunnelingChisel executable, compressed package, and packed data namesPossible tunneling, pivoting, or relay support; runtime behavior unverified.
RDP proxyingrdp_proxy.py, rdp_proxy2.py, rdp_proxy3.pyPossible remote-access relay capability; content not acquired.
Credential or token collectiontok_steal.ps1, tok2.ps1, regsave.ps1, recv_hive.php, jwks.jsonPotential credential-access material; no secrets were observed because files were not acquired.
Server-side collection or proxyingcollect.php, recv.php, recv_hive.php, api-proxy.php, proxy.phpPotential collection or relay endpoints; no requests were sent to these files.
SSRF/RFI or application testingredirect_ssrf.php, rfi_check.php, Exploit.class, cf_probe/, CORS proof-of-concept namesReconnaissance or testing theme; successful exploitation is not established.
Persistent public exposureIdentical 151-entry listings in two capturesConfirmed exposure persistence; no inference about process persistence.

4. Network Indicators

Indicator IDURL / EndpointAssociated Evidence
NI-001hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/Direct passive acquisition; unauthenticated directory listing.
NI-002hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/beacon-v10Filename observed in root listing; artifact not acquired.
NI-003hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/chisel[.]exeFilename observed in root listing; artifact not acquired.
NI-004hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/rdp_proxy[.]pyFilename observed in root listing; artifact not acquired.
NI-005hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/tok_steal[.]ps1Filename observed in root listing; artifact not acquired.
NI-006hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/recv_hive[.]phpFilename observed in root listing; artifact not acquired.
NI-007hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/redirect_ssrf[.]phpFilename observed in root listing; artifact not acquired.
NI-008hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/sipro4[.]pemFilename observed in root listing; contents not acquired.
NI-009hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/sipro_script[.]pemFilename observed in root listing; contents not acquired.
NI-010hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/cf_probe/Directory observed in root listing; descendants not acquired.
NI-011hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/data/Directory observed in root listing; descendants not acquired.
NI-012hxxp://217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085/dl/Directory observed in root listing; descendants not acquired.

No additional remote IP, domain, callback, or C2 endpoint was established from the current host. The related 94[.]154[.]43[.]249 indicator belongs to supplied 150/194 cluster evidence and is not a current-host observation.

5. Cross-Cluster Correlation

The current host most closely resembles the supplied Windows-oriented staging context represented by the 93[.]152[.]223[.]39 and 101[.]42[.]255[.]92 dossiers. The overlap consists of beacon/C2 terminology, Windows payload or lure staging, proxying, credential-access themes, and exposure of operational infrastructure. This is thematic correlation only; the current host’s files were not acquired and no shared hashes, URLs, certificates, credentials, or artifact contents were identified.

The supplied 150[.]241[.]65[.]250 dossier documents a separate Linux/IoT staging node with raul.* payloads, historical pito.* execution, shell history, and a port-889 HTTP service. The current host does not visibly expose raul.*, pito.*, bot.i686, gg11, or dp.sh names. The relationship between the two hosts is therefore limited to a broad pattern of exposed operational staging infrastructure.

The supplied 194[.]238[.]57[.]124 dossier contains pito.*, gg11, dp.sh, and multi-architecture Linux payload evidence. None of those filename families was observed in the current root listing. No direct technical relationship is established.

CorrelationEvidenceConfidence
Shared Windows-oriented staging model with 93[.]152[.]223[.]39Beacon, exploit/probe, web-handler, and credential-access naming themesMedium
Shared operational staging model with 150[.]241[.]65[.]250Public directory exposure and apparent tool workspaceLow-to-medium
Shared Linux multi-architecture payload family with 194[.]238[.]57[.]124No pito.*, gg11, or dp.sh names observed on current hostLow / not established
Exact ownership or operator identityNo shared hash, URL, certificate, credential, or artifact contentNot established
Active C2 relationshipNo callback, traffic, execution, or runtime evidenceNot established

6. PE and LNK Assessment

The root listing contains multiple .exe, .dll, .cab, .pkg, and related Windows-oriented filenames, but no PE file was downloaded or parsed. They remain PE candidates by filename extension only. No .lnk filename was observed in the root listing. This conclusion is limited because descendants and file contents were not acquired.

7. Secrets and Sensitive Material

The public listing exposes filenames that may represent private keys, certificates, tokens, registry material, authentication data, or collection endpoints. In particular, sipro4.pem, sipro_script.pem, jwks.json, tok_steal.ps1, tok2.ps1, regsave.ps1, and recv_hive.php should be treated as sensitive indicators. No actual key, token, password, cookie, or credential value was acquired or reproduced in this dossier.

If the infrastructure belongs to the organization, all credentials, keys, tokens, cookies, and certificates found during authorized acquisition should be rotated through a trusted administrative path, with sessions invalidated and recent use reviewed.

  1. Restrict public access to 217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085 if the host is organizationally controlled, while preserving web-server, reverse-proxy, firewall, authentication, process, and cloud logs.

  2. Preserve a forensic image and volatile state before deleting or modifying individual artifacts; capture directory timestamps, process/socket state, scheduled tasks, services, web-server configuration, and access logs.

  3. Hunt endpoint, proxy, DNS, firewall, and identity telemetry for 217[.]216[.]79[.]49, port 8085, Chisel process names, RDP proxy activity, beacon-like process trees, PowerShell token or registry access, and requests to the exposed server-side handlers.

  4. Treat any private keys, tokens, cookies, database strings, cloud credentials, or authentication material discovered during authorized acquisition as compromised and rotate them.

  5. Acquire and statically analyze the smallest authorized set of suspicious scripts, certificate/key files, PE candidates, PHP/ASP.NET handlers, and Chisel-related artifacts; compute SHA-256 hashes and compare them with the supplied cluster evidence.

  6. Do not execute acquired binaries or scripts on production systems. Use an isolated analysis environment with no trusted credentials and controlled network access.

  7. If the host is not owned by the organization, do not attempt login, exploitation, upload, execution, or bulk acquisition; report the persistent public exposure through the relevant provider, CERT, abuse desk, or authorized incident-response channel.

Conclusion

The endpoint at 217[.]216[.]79[.]49:8085 continues to expose a persistent unauthenticated directory containing 151 mixed Windows, .NET, Java, PowerShell, PHP, ASP.NET, package, and data entries. The concentration of beacon-like names, Chisel artifacts, RDP proxy scripts, credential/system-collection-labelled files, web handlers, and exploit/probe names supports a high-priority suspicious exposed-infrastructure assessment.

The evidence is sufficient to justify containment, preservation, credential review, and targeted threat hunting if the host is organizationally controlled. It is not sufficient to confirm active C2, successful exploitation, victim compromise, maliciousness of every listed artifact, or common ownership with the supplied Linux/IoT 150[.]241[.]65[.]250 and 194[.]238[.]57[.]124 clusters.