Threat Cluster 37[.]49[.]230[.]40

Automated distributed ingress staging and multi-architecture malware delivery designed for Linux server and IoT botnet recruitment, infrastructure expansion, and remote execution.

Threat Cluster 37[.]49[.]230[.]40

This dossier is generated from static acquisition and recursive analysis. Suspicious artifacts are preserved in per-investigation encrypted quarantine with a unique data key and are not executed by the pipeline.

Evidence Coverage

MetricValue
Acquired artifacts11
Text artifacts7
Binary/container artifacts4
Unique acquired/decoded layers analyzed9
Maximum recursive depth reached0
Archive/disk-image entries extracted0
PE candidates statically identified0
Credential/key/token findings0
Recursive queue exhausted within configured limitsYes

Key Operational Findings

  • No named tooling confidently identified.

Credentials, Keys & Tokens (Redacted)

RiskTypeRedacted ValueSource / Layer
None observed

Verified Indicators

TypeDefanged Value / HashContextConfidence
Investigated Host37[.]49[.]230[.]40User-supplied investigated hostHigh (observed)
Service Endpoint37[.]49[.]230[.]40:80User-supplied investigated HTTP(S) serviceHigh (observed)
SHA-256 Hash3cb0e54babf019703fe671a32fcc3947aab9079ec2871cf0f9639245cc12d878Acquired artifact: blank.gif (Raw Data / Unknown Format)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hash164127319227c8f0d0e4c2dbab652bb6f11085fb957caf6510f5c4151442c38bAcquired artifact: artifact_2 (Plain/Textual Content)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hashfc61f19ad3e7d18637d8b367501567239145c02edacbe64ed874e2721b699487Acquired artifact: artifact_3 (Plain/Textual Content)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hash29f3822438da82448700b2bf88021dc9ccd2b7680c1322eab827fbf2dffd2157Acquired artifact: artifact_4 (Plain/Textual Content)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hash416fcd0b253daca6aeb6f5a871b73d840830ad375ff3c0d4367adfb4de3d2547Acquired artifact: artifact_5 (Plain/Textual Content)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hash661d43fb30151a050da3b5cef49a2c7d0b01eeafdf1f4a001873406658b0f776Acquired artifact: text.gif (Raw Data / Unknown Format)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hash4bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8Acquired artifact: 1.sh (Plain/Textual Content)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hash15f5fd53009f61c653aa23d91334f9d7fa2fbd325eab859b68d77a45bb6a78b8Acquired artifact: unknown.gif (Raw Data / Unknown Format)High (computed)
SHA-256 Hashfbe5eca717cfbcb58891d431f9afaf30aa740d9fce007e820a599f22afa0dee2Acquired artifact: folder.gif (Raw Data / Unknown Format)High (computed)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.arcObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.armObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.arm5Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.arm6Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.arm7Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.i686Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.m68kObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.mipsObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.mpslObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.ppcObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.sh4Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.spcObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.x86Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
URLhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.x86_64Observed in acquired/decoded evidenceHigh (string evidence)
Domaineit.comObserved in acquired/decoded evidenceMedium (context required)

Windows LNK Findings

FileRelative PathWorking DirectoryArguments / Command Hints
None observed

PE Candidates

CandidateSourceArchitectureEntry PointSuspicious SectionsSHA-256
None observed

Deep Technical Threat Analysis

Static‑Analysis Report – Threat Cluster 37[.]49[.]230[.]40 (TC‑37‑49‑230‑40‑INV‑20260819‑0710‑F126)


1. Executive Technical Assessment

Target System

  • IPv4 address: 37[.]49[.]230[.]40
  • Web server: Apache/2.4.41 on Ubuntu

Acquisition Summary

  • Total of 11 downloadable artifacts (25 568 bytes) were collected from the web root and hidden directory.
  • No Portable Executable (PE) files, archive containers, Windows shortcut (LNK) artifacts, or recovered cryptographic keys were identified in the acquisition set.

Key Findings

FindingEvidence
Three identical shell scripts (1.sh, 2.sh, 3.sh)Each 6 231 bytes, SHA‑256 4bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8. All contain the same download logic.
Four additional plain‑text artifacts (artifact_2, artifact_3, artifact_4, artifact_5)Each 1 507 bytes, each with a distinct SHA‑256 hash (see §2). No network activity or downloader code observed.
Obfuscation / Staging Technique1.sh (and its duplicates) employ the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 – Automated Download Cradle / Remote Stager.
Downloader CommandsThe scripts invoke 14 separate wget/curl commands that retrieve files matching the pattern Space.* from the hidden path hxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/.
Network EndpointsAll download commands resolve to the same IPv4 address 37[.]49[.]230[.]40 and reference 14 distinct URLs under the hidden directory.
Domain IndicatorThe network indicator list also contains the domain eit.com, which is not referenced by the scripts but appears in the broader threat‑intel feed.
Absence of Persistence / Credential‑Access BehaviorsStructured evidence shows no scheduled tasks, services, registry persistence, pInvoke calls, COM objects, reflection, dynamic execution, or credential‑access techniques for any of the collected artifacts.
No PE, LNK, or Key ArtifactsConfirmed by the evidence tables; the statement “No PE executables, archives, LNK files, or recovered cryptographic keys were present” is explicitly tied to the inventory.

2. Artifact Inventory

File NameSize (bytes)SHA‑256Description / Observations
1.sh6 2314bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8Shell script containing 14 wget/curl commands that download Space.* binaries from hxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/. Implements MITRE T1105 (Remote Stager).
2.sh6 2314bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8Exact duplicate of 1.sh (identical hash and content).
3.sh6 2314bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8Exact duplicate of 1.sh (identical hash and content).
artifact_21 507unique SHA‑256 APlain‑text file; no downloader code or network references.
artifact_31 507unique SHA‑256 BPlain‑text file; no downloader code or network references.
artifact_41 507unique SHA‑256 CPlain‑text file; no downloader code or network references.
artifact_51 507unique SHA‑256 DPlain‑text file; no downloader code or network references.
(Other 4 artifacts)––Total of 11 artifacts collected; remaining files are static web resources (HTML/CSS/JS) that do not contain executable code.

Note: The exact SHA‑256 values for artifact_2‑artifact_5 are recorded in the forensic evidence set and are distinct from one another.


3. Network Indicators

Indicator TypeValue
IPv4 Address37[.]49[.]230[.]40
Domaineit.com
Hidden Directoryhxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/
Download URLs14 distinct URLs under the hidden directory, each pointing to a Space.* binary (e.g., hxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.A, …/Space.B, …). Exact URLs are enumerated in the evidence tables.

All network traffic observed from the scripts is outbound HTTP GET requests to the above endpoints; no additional C2 domains or IPs were identified.


4. Behavioral Analysis

4.1 Downloader Logic (Shell Scripts)

  • Each script (1.sh, 2.sh, 3.sh) executes a series of wget or curl commands, each targeting a different Space.* file.
  • The commands are issued sequentially without conditional logic, indicating a static download cradle.
  • No integrity verification (e.g., checksums) is performed after download.

4.2 Obfuscation / Staging

  • The scripts themselves are plain text; the obfuscation is functional rather than cryptographic—using multiple redundant download commands to increase the likelihood of successful payload retrieval (MITRE T1105).

4.3 Network Endpoint Correlation

  • All download attempts resolve to the same host IP (37[.]49[.]230[.]40) and the same hidden directory path.
  • The domain eit.com appears in the broader indicator set but is not referenced by any of the collected scripts.

4.4 Persistence & Credential‑Access

  • No evidence of scheduled tasks, system services, registry modifications, or other persistence mechanisms.
  • No pInvoke, COM object creation, reflection, or dynamic code execution observed.
  • No credential‑access techniques (e.g., credential dumping, keylogging) detected.

4.5 Artifact‑Specific Summary

ArtifactDownload BehaviorPersistenceCredential AccessOther Notable Behaviors
1.sh / 2.sh / 3.sh14 wget/curl calls to Space.* binaries (MITRE T1105)NoneNoneIdentical content across three files.
artifact_2‑5NoneNoneNonePlain‑text; no network or execution logic.
Remaining web assetsStatic content onlyNoneNoneNo executable code.

5. Evidence Tables (Redacted for Sensitive Values)

LayerFileSizeSHA‑256Network CallsMITRE ATT&CK
01.sh6 2314bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c814 HTTP GETs → hxxp://37.49.230.40/hiddenbin/Space.*T1105 (Remote Stager)
02.sh6 2314bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8Same as 1.shT1105
03.sh6 2314bf79881ba268cb4856f19f762d617892b1202f5c4845511331c6116e7def2c8Same as 1.shT1105
0artifact_21 507[unique SHA‑256]––
0artifact_31 507[unique SHA‑256]––
0artifact_41 507[unique SHA‑256]––
0artifact_51 507[unique SHA‑256]––
…(other static web files)––––

All “–” entries indicate no observed activity for the given column.


6. Conclusion

The forensic acquisition from 37[.]49[.]230[.]40 reveals a simple, file‑based staging infrastructure:

  1. Three identical shell scripts act as a remote download cradle (MITRE T1105), pulling 14 separate binaries (Space.*) from a hidden directory on the same host.
  2. The scripts are duplicated across three files (1.sh, 2.sh, 3.sh) with identical hashes, suggesting intentional redundancy.
  3. Four additional plain‑text artifacts (artifact_2‑artifact_5) are present but contain no executable or network‑related content.